Grief as a limit of akrasia in aristotelian ethics

Abstract

This article examines whether grief, understood as stérēsis resulting from the loss of the héteros autós, can be interpreted in light of akrasia in Aristotle’s ethics. Drawing on the definition of akrasia as a conflict between rational judgment and a competing desire (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII), it argues that grief constitutes a form of practical ineffectiveness without cognitive error, and is therefore irreducible to this model. Pain (lýpē) does not imply opposition to logos nor the presence of a competing desiderative principle; rather, it affects the conditions under which deliberation is actualized in the particular, impacting the transition from bouleusis to praxis. Phronesis retains its normative validity, although its practical realization is weakened. The analysis thus shifts from motivational conflict to the conditions of effectiveness of practical judgment. Finally, the paper proposes a distinct form of practical failure, irreducible to both akrasia and virtue, in which mnēmē preserves the continuity of ethos by sustaining the orientation of logos under conditions of absence.